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Abstract: Problem statement: Delivering services online is important in e-health. Services that are 
delivered  through  online  communications  between  engaging  parties,  often  involve  sensitive 
information  transmitted  over  the  Internet.  However,  while  the  Internet  successfully  facilitates 
these services, significant threats also come in parallel. Network attacks, information breaches 
and malicious software on a computer system are common threats to the Internet. These threats 
can  cause  severe damage  to  computer  systems  and  also  the  information.  As  we  study  current 
security technologies particularly that provide security to online communications, we found out 
that these technologies do not cater for different kinds of security needs because of the rigid way 
the security mechanisms are constructed. Therefore, we are interested in developing a security 
model that facilitates these needs, specifically in e-health. Approach: First, the area where different 
security  requirements  are  needed  are  explored,  such  as  the  information  classification  found  in 
ISO17799. This classification is based on the sensitivity levels of the information, where the more 
sensitive information requires higher security measures compared to the less sensitive information. 
Then, the information classification is applied to the e-health environment, so that our security model 
can  handle  the  security  processes  for  each  classification.  Results:  The  multilayer  communication 
approach or MLC is the proposed security model. MLC classifies communications in e-health into five 
categories: Layer 1 to Layer 5 representing extremely sensitive, highly sensitive, medium sensitive, 
low  sensitive  and  no  sensitive  data.  This  classification  refers  to  the  different  sensitivity  of  the 
information  exchanged  during  communications.  For  example,  Extremely  Sensitive  communication 
involves exchanging extremely sensitive information,  which requires highest security  mechanisms, 
while Low Sensitive communication requires lower security mechanism. Conclusion: MLC provides 
five  different  types  of  security  needs,  where  users  can  flexibly  choose  their  own  security 
preferences for their online communications, which the current technologies are lacking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  The  Internet  plays  a  major  role  for  delivering 
services in e-health, since it offers cheap and worldwide 
access.  Sulaiman  et  al.  (2007)  discusses  examples  of 
online  communications  in  e-health,  which  include 
videoconferencing  sessions,  x-ray  image  sharing, 
electronic  mails,  web-based  applications  and  also 
software  applications  used  with  mobile  devices  (e.g. 
PDA and smart phones) to assist mobile users. Using 
the  Internet  in  e-health  promises  to  improve 
communication between users, because patients in rural 
areas can access services such as consultation sessions, 
diagnostic aid and remote patient monitoring (Kay et 
al., 2011; E Health News. Eu, 2011). In this study, the 
term  “communication”  is  defined  as  a  process  of 
sharing  and  exchanging  information  between  two  or 
more parties in the e-health domain. 
  However,  although  there  are  many  Internet-based 
technologies developed to facilitate the communication 
processes  and  enhance  healthcare  service  delivery,  the 
Internet has its own drawbacks. It is exposed to security 
threats,  which  exploit  the  vulnerability  of  computer 
systems.  The  threats  include  network  attacks, J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1691-1703, 2011 
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information breaches by intruders and malicious software 
or malware (Symantec Corp, 2010; Georgia Tech, 2008).   
  Current  security  technologies  such  as 
SSL/TLS, IPSec, SSH, or VPN have been robustly put 
into practice to provide security mechanisms to online 
communications.  In  practice,  in  order  to  use  such 
technologies,  for  example  SSL,  one  must  configure 
the  security  setting  and  select  appropriate  cipher 
suites,  which  is  a  combination  of  algorithms  for 
authentication, encryption and message authentication 
code (MAC), which are used to negotiate the security 
settings when starting a connection. However, we are 
interested  in  finding  a  way  to  provide  security 
mechanisms  that  can  cater  for  different  types  of 
security needs. For example, communications from a 
sender  to  multiple  recipients  can  be  done  using 
different  security  strengths,  without  having  to 
reconfigure the security setting. As to our knowledge, 
current security technologies only provide or can only 
be set to one particular value of cipher suites for every 
communications, that is, if one wants to have stronger 
or weaker security, the security must be reconfigured. 
We address this problem through our security model 
namely the Multilayer Communication (MLC).  
 
Security  technologies:  There  are  various  aspects  that 
have been catered for in the security field, such as from 
monitoring  the  security  at  the  network  perimeter 
(firewalls  and  IDSs);  securing  the  hosts  inside  the 
network (personal firewalls and antiviruses); to securing 
communications  between  hosts  (SSL,  SSH,  IPSec  and 
VPN).  Here  we  focus  our  discussion  in  securing 
communications  between  hosts,  which  revolve  around 
technologies like SSL/TLS, IPSec, SSH and VPN. These 
technologies  have  the  same  characteristic,  which  use 
cryptography protocols for the security processes. 
  Secure  Socket  Layer  (SSL)  was  developed  by 
Netscape  Corporation  (http://netscape.aol.com/)  and 
later  standardized  and  known  as  Transport  Layer 
Security (TLS). It works on the transport layer of the 
OSI  model,  which  means,  it  protects  traffic  in  the 
application layer. In general, SSL’s goal is to provide a 
secure channel between the sender and recipient. In the 
Initial  handshake  process,  both  sender  and  recipient 
negotiate on a cipher suite that is a set of cryptography 
algorithms  that  will  be  used  in  the  communication 
session. The cipher suite is a composition of the public 
key  mechanism  such  as  RSA,  a  symmetric  cipher 
(block cipher such as RC4, Triple DES, AES, IDEA, or 
DES)  and  hash  algorithm  such  as  MD5  or  SHA  and 
their associated key size. 
  Although  SSL/TLS  does  not  provide  security 
automatically  to  an  application  that  wishes  to  benefit 
from the SSL/TLS functionalities (to deploy SSL/TLS, 
the application must be specifically programmed to be 
SSL/TLS aware), the deployment of SSL/TLS continues 
to grow at a robust rate.  
  IP layer security or IPSec (RFCs 2401-2411 and 
RFC 2451) provides security protection to the Internet 
layer and protects all IP data packets regardless of the 
protection given on the application layer and transport 
layer.  No  modification  or  reprogramming  of 
applications is needed if IPSec is used. IPSec uses two 
protocols to provide security protections, which are the 
Authentication  Header  (AH)  and  Encapsulating 
Security Payload (ESP). AH provides data integrity and 
authentication  of  origin  of  the  IP  packets.  The 
authentication process is based on MAC, using HMAC 
algorithm (Krawczyk et al., 1997) and a secret key. 
  ESP  on  the  other  hand  provides  full 
confidentiality through an encryption process and an 
optional  authentication.  ESP  provides  an  encryption 
mechanism  to  encrypt  IP  packets  before  being 
transmitted to the receiver host and there the packets 
are decrypted. This provides confidentiality to the data 
and prevents any eavesdropping to the data. Various 
types  of  algorithms  are  supported  by  IPSec  for 
encryption  performed  by  ESP  such  as  Triple  DES, 
RC5, IDEA, CAST and Blowfish.  
  Virtual  Private  Network  (VPN)  is  a  private  and 
secure  connection  established  from  two  connected 
networks  from  sender  to  recipient  over  the  Internet. 
VPN works by tunnelling IP packets by adding a new 
header to the packet, so that it can be encrypted and 
authenticated. Then, at the receiving end, the packets 
are assembled to the original form. The receiving end 
can  be  firewalls,  routers,  gateway,  or  hosts.  VPN 
provides  a  number  of  tunnelling  protocols,  such  as 
Point-to-Point  Tunnelling  Protocol  (PPTP),  that  takes 
place at the Data-link layer and uses TCP port 1723. It 
encapsulates  PPP  packets  and  transmits  the  packets 
through a tunnel over a public IP network. 
  PPP  uses  authentication  protocols  such  as 
Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) and Microsoft 
Challenge-Handshake  Authentication  Protocol  (MS-
CHAP).  PPP  provides  confidentiality  on  the  data  by 
providing encryption using DES and 3DES.  
  Besides  these  technologies,  there  are  also 
proprietary  software  tools  that  support  online 
communications such as demonstrated by GoToMyPC 
(http://gotomypc.com), Groove (http://www.groove.net) 
and Waste (http://waste.sourceforge.net/). GoToMyPC 
uses  multiple  layers  of  strong  passwords  as 
authentication,  data  confidentiality  using  SSL  with 
AES-128  bit  and  end-to-end  authentication.  Groove 
uses passwordbased authentication; DES and AES-192 J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1691-1703, 2011 
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bit algorithms to provide data confidentiality on disk; as 
well as to data over the network to provide end-to-end 
security.  Data  integrity  is  also  provided  using  hash 
message and message authentication code. Waste uses 
TLS to provide data confidentiality and builds a web-
based PKI for trust between the users. 
  We  emphasize  our  research  on  the 
application/software  security,  which  is  realized  by 
integrating  the  security  with  the   applications   of 
information   systems   of   the  health   organization. 
This   is   to   provide   authentication,   confidentiality 
and    availability  to  the  information,  using 
cryptography protocols to encrypt, decrypt, sign and 
hash messages (Jinyuan et al.,  2011; Zhang and Liu, 
2010; Garcia-Morchon et al., 2009). SSL is used to 
established  a  secure  network  for  information 
exchanges  (Markovic,  2006;  Ulieru  and  Ionescu, 
2004).  The  commonly  used  security  protection  for 
mobile  device  that  uses  wireless  LAN  are  user 
authentication  and  encrypted  wireless  network 
(Elkhodr et al., 2011; Jaizanuar, 2009; Yu et al., 2008; 
Ahmad,  2003).  In  addition  SSL  is  also  used  on 
wireless  devices  to  provide  transport  level  security 
(Gupta and Gupta, 2001; Marti et al., 2004). 
  However,  from  studying  the  existing  security 
technology,  we  learned  that  for  each  technology,  the 
level of the security provided is not flexible and cannot 
be changed according to the organization’s need. This 
is  because  the  security  configuration  in  the  security 
mechanisms,  such  as  SSL  is  set  to  provide  a  fixed 
security to the user per communication session. If there 
is  a  change  in  the  organization’s  need  for  a  higher 
security  level  for  example,  the  SSL  needs  to  be 
reconfigured at the security setting. 
  In  general,  each  technology  offers  a  list  of 
available and supported symmetric algorithms that are 
used  to  encrypt  messages  in  transit  during  the 
communication sessions. However, these technologies 
do not cater for different types of security needs in an 
organization. Consider that an organization uses SSL 
for  its  secure  communications.  If  the  organization 
needs  to  change  the  security  strength  of  the  SSL 
channel such as shown IBM (2009), to be stronger or 
weaker,  it  cannot  be  flexibly  provided  to  the 
organization. The person in charge, like the Security 
Administrator,  needs  to  reconfigure  the  systems  to 
change the security setting. 
  The need for stronger or weaker security strengths 
is  necessary  in  information  classification  standard, 
such as portrayed in ISO 17799, where distinguished 
level  of  security  protection  is  needed  for  different 
types  of  information  with  different  levels  of 
sensitivity.  In  an  organization,  different  types  of 
communications  carry  different  types  of  messages. 
These messages contain different types of information 
with different levels of sensitivity. 
  We are motivated to find the best way to secure 
these different types of communications in such a way 
that it could provide different types of security strengths 
to the communication, which can be selected flexibly 
by  the  user.  The  next  section  discusses  the  different 
types  of  information  as  well  as  information 
classification in further detail. 
 
Sensitive information and the level of sensitivity: In 
this  section,  we  introduce  the  concepts  of  sensitive 
information  and  the  level  of  sensitivity  of  the 
information in greater details. Sensitive information are 
those  that  should  not  be  revealed  to  public  (Pfleeger 
and  Pfleeger,  2003).  Whether  the  information  is 
considered sensitive, is based on the importance or the 
values of the information and who is communicating it. 
It is important for an organization to decide whether the 
information will cause a significant loss to the holder if 
it is made public. For instance, a communication that 
exchanges information such as a name, a place and a 
meeting time, are less  sensitive than information that 
has a name, an address and types of diseases that are 
considered more sensitive. A third party that intercepts 
this  conversation  may  correlate  the  information  and 
conclude that a person with that name and address has 
that  particular  type  of  diseases.  Such  information,  if 
revealed to public will cause embarrassment and loss of 
reputation to the patient. 
  “The  desired  degree  of  secrecy  about  such 
information  is  known  as  its  sensitivity”  (Economic-
Expert, 2009) such as more sensitive or less sensitive. 
The  level  of  sensitivity  of  the  information  can  also 
refers to the degrees of loss or potential damage to the 
holder, if the information is  disclosed to a party that 
does not have any authority to access it. The levels of 
sensitivity  of  information  often  relate  to  the 
classification of sensitive information.  
  Classification of sensitive information can be seen 
adopted  in  most  governments  and  business-related 
organization  around  the  world.  Classification  of 
information  is  considered  important  because  it 
provides guidelines to (1) classify certain information 
to  different  levels  of  sensitivity  and  (2)  protect 
information  from  any  unauthorized  access  by 
providing a distinguish level of security protection to 
the information. J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1691-1703, 2011 
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Information  classification:  There  are  existing 
standards  for  information  classification.  ISO  provides 
information  classification  guideline  in  ISO  17799, 
which  classify  information  as  Top  Secret,  Highly 
Confidential, Proprietary, Internal Use Only and Public 
Documents.  Each  of  these  classifications  categorizes 
different types of information with different levels of 
sensitivity. The verbatim definition of each criterion is 
as follows (ISO17799): 
 
·  Top  secret:  Highly  sensitive  internal  documents 
and  data.  Has  very  restricted  distribution  indeed 
and must be protected at all times. Security at this 
level is the highest possible. 
·  Highly  confidential:  Information  which  is 
considered  critical  to  the  organization’s  ongoing 
operations  and  could  seriously  impede  or  disrupt 
them  if  made  shared  internally  or  made  public. 
Security should be very high. 
·  Proprietary: Procedures, project plans, operational 
work  routines,  designs  and  specifications  that 
define the way in which the organization operates. 
Used by authorized personnel only. Security at this 
level is high 
·  Internal  use  only:  Information  not  approved  for 
general circulation outside the organization, where 
its  disclosure  would  inconvenience  the 
organization  or  management,  but  is  unlikely  to 
result  in  financial  loss  or  serious  damage  to 
credibility/reputation.  Security  at  this  level  is 
controlled but normal 
·  Public  documents:  Information  in  the  public 
domain. Security at this level is minimal. 
 
  Meanwhile,  the  US  government  categorises, 
sensitive  information  as  Top  Secret,  Secret  and 
Confidential. Australia and New Zealand governments 
have an additional criterion known as Restricted. The 
verbatim  definitions  of  the  information  classification 
are as follows (EO12958, 1995; SIGS, 2001): 
 
·  Top secret: The unauthorized disclosure of which 
reasonably  could  be  expected  to  cause 
exceptionally grave damage to the national security 
that the original classification authority is able to 
identify or describe 
·  Secret:  The  unauthorized  disclosure  of  which 
reasonably  could  be  expected  to  cause  serious 
damage  to  the  national  security  that  the  original 
classification authority is able to identify or describe 
·  Confidential: The unauthorized disclosure of which 
reasonably could be expected to cause damage to 
the national security that the original classification 
authority is able to identify or describe 
·  Restricted: Compromise of information would be 
likely to affect the national interests in an adverse 
manner 
 
Technology gap: From the information classifications, 
we can imply that (1) ‘Top Secret’ is the most sensitive 
information, or (2) ‘Highly Confidential’ information is 
more  sensitive  than  ‘Proprietary’  information,  or  (3) 
‘Confidential’ information is less sensitive than Secret 
information. We can also imply that more sensitive data 
has  greater  degree  of  loss  or  potential  damage 
compared to the less sensitive data. 
  However,  with  the  current  technologies,  these 
different types of security levels cannot be applied to 
the different types of communications in the example of 
communication  scenarios  described  above.  This  is 
because  current  technologies  only  allow  all 
communications  sessions  to  be  secured  with  the  same 
security strength. The key lengths in the symmetric key 
encryption determine the strength of the encryption and 
thus  represent  the  security  level  or  security  strength 
(Security  level  and  security  strength  will  be  used 
interchangeably  throughout  this  study)  that  can  be 
provided to secure the communication. This symmetric 
key is selected during the configuration or set up phase. 
If  one  wants  to  change  the  security  levels  of  the 
communication, one needs to reconfigure the setting. 
  Only  one  cipher  is  chosen  for  a  communication 
session. Therefore, if a user wants to send two different 
messages  with  two  different  classifications  to  two 
different  recipients,  this  user  needs  to  use  different 
ciphers with different security level by reconfiguring the 
cipher  or  cipher  suite  field.  In  other  words,  current 
technologies do not cater for the following requirements: 
 
·  Provide  different  security  strengths  to  secure 
different types of communications 
·  Provide  mechanisms  to  handle  security  for  low 
processing devices 
 
  In the next sections we will investigate further the 
types  of  information  and  the  sensitivity  levels  of  the 
information that is transmitted during communications 
in  e-health.  Then,  we  proposed  an  information 
classification  based  on  ISO17799  to  classify  the 
information in e-health. J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1691-1703, 2011 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Communication  scenarios:  In  this  section,  we 
construct  a  general  or  typical  type  of  a  hospital 
environment.  For  simplicity  purposes,  the  users 
involved in the communication either from inside the 
hospital local network or from the outside network are 
simplified  and  identified  as  Doctor,  Patient,  Nurse, 
Social Worker (SW), Paramedic, System Coordinator 
(SC)  and  System  Administrator  (SyA),  as  shown  in 
Fig.  1.  Seven  main  types  of  communications  are 
identified and numbered as the following. 
  The  symbol  ‘Û‘  indicates  a  two-way 
communication.  The  shaded  area  implies 
communication that occurs within the hospital’s local 
network.  The  communication  can  also  occur  from 
within  the  hospital  to  the  outside  network.  This 
communication is useful particularly for users who are 
far away. 
  For example, a doctor at the hospital communicates 
with another doctor at another hospital; a patient or SW 
at home communicates with a doctor at the hospital; or 
a paramedic at a location of an accident communicates 
with SC at the hospital. The paramedic and SC work 
together  in  a  distributed  way.  The  information 
regarding  a  patient  is  sent  by  the  paramedic  using  a 
PDA  or  a  smart  phone  and  received  by  SC  in  the 
hospital  for  further  action,  such  as  preparing  for  a 
medical team while waiting for the patient to arrive at 
the  hospital.  The  public  can  also  communicate  and 
obtain  information  with  the  hospital,  through  the 
hospital’s  website.  For  example,  to  get  the  hospital’s 
annual reports, available services, opening hours, public 
announcement and information on diseases. 
  Table  1  describes  the  different  types  of 
information  being  exchanged  during  communication 
in the hospital and who is communicating it. There is 
information that is more sensitive than the other. For 
instance, information that came from communications 
between  Doctors,  Patient,  Nurse  and  Paramedic  is 
more  sensitive  than  information  that  came  from 
SWÛNurse communications. 
  Doctors  discuss  about  the  critical  level  of  a 
patient’s illness. A doctor discusses with a patient about 
his/her detailed medical information (such as diagnosis, 
medical  history,  test  results,  current  treatment  and 
prescriptions)  in  a  consultation  session.  A  nurse 
communicates  with  a  doctor  regarding  a  patient’s 
personal  information  (such  as  name,  address,  age, 
gender,  contact  person,  medication).  The  nurse  also 
communicates  with  the  patient,  regarding  his/her 
medication. As for SWÛNurse communications, only 
general information about a patient is involve, such as 
name, contact person and a ward number. 
 
 
Fig.1: Different types of communications in a hospital 
organization 
 
Layered  approach:  As  we  have  illustrates  in  the 
previous  section,  there  are  more  than  one  type  of 
communications in the hospital. We could classify these 
communications  into  groups,  based  on  the  different 
levels of security provided to secure different levels of 
sensitivity of the information. The idea is comparable to 
the one in (IBM, 2009), to classify  SSL cipher. It is 
based on three types of the key lengths classifications, 
which are HIGH, with key lengths larger than 128-bit; 
MEDIUM,  with  key  lengths  equal  to  128-bit;  and 
LOW, with key length smaller than 128-bit. However, 
this classification is limited to only three classifications, 
which  cannot  accommodate  information  classification 
such as modelled ISO17799 (2007) and SIGS (2001) 
described earlier. 
  Suppose that there are more than three types of 
information with different levels of sensitivity. Thus we 
need more than three types of communications and as a 
result,  we  need  more  than  three  types  of  security 
mechanisms.  In  this  situation,  we  believed  that 
characterizing  the  communications  into  a  layered 
structure is the best way to cater for the security level. 
Therefore, based on ISO17799, we portray the security 
levels in a layered architecture, featured in Fig. 2.   J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1691-1703, 2011 
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Table 1: Different types of information exchanged between users 
Communication   Types of information 
DoctorÛDoctor  Doctors  communicate  with  each  other 
regarding  the  critical  level  of  a  patient’s 
llness  and  the  best  medication 
recommendation. 
DoctorÛPatient  A doctor gives consultation to a remote 
patient (e.g. patient at home) from hospital. 
Information discussed involves detailed 
medical information. 
DoctorÛNurse  A nurse communicates with a doctor 
concerning a patient’s personal   information 
and current medical condition 
NurseÛPatient  A  nurse  communicates  with  a  patient  at 
  home  concerning patient’s medications.   
DoctorÛSW  A  remote  SW  asks  advise  from  a
  doctor  at  the  hospital  on  a  problem  arises
  when helping a patient at home 
SWÛNurse   A  SW  worker  asks  for  patient’s 
  general information from the 
  nurse   
SWÛPatient  A remote social worker communicates with a 
remote patient regarding appointmentrequest 
for counselling sessions 
ParamedicÛSC  A paramedic updates patient’s  information 
(such  as  patient’s  personal  information, 
medical  information: allergy, blood pressure 
and medical history) at a location of 
an  accident  to  the  database  using  his  PDA. 
The  information  is  retrieved  by  SC  who 
manages the database of accident cases 
SyA Û All users  Concerning user accounts 
Public (open channel)  With  security-  Any  user  that  wants  toget 
access  or  contact  information  to  any  
sensitive  information  (e.g.:  a  researcher) 
Without  security-  annual  reports,  services 
available,  public  announcement  and 
information on diseases  
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Examples of multilayered structure 
 
  The  top  layer  represents  the  most  sensitive 
information,  while  the  lowest  layer  represents  the 
lowest  sensitive  information.  We  could  adopt  this 
characterization concept of information classification to 
classify online communication. Then, we can organize 
and  apply  security  mechanisms  with  security  levels 
appropriate  to  each  layer.  With  the  use  of  a 
multilayered structure it can lead to several advantages, 
for  example  modularity:  security  mechanisms  can  be 
captured independently based on the policy defined at 
every  layer;  and  flexibility:  any  element  of  security 
mechanisms  can  be  added  or  removed  systematically 
when necessary, for example, we can add or remove a 
cipher with a certain key length to/from the layer. 
 
Levels  of  sensitivity:  In  this  section,  we  discuss  the 
levels  of  sensitivity  of  the  information  in  Table  1, 
which  will  be  one  step  forward  to  establish  our 
proposed MLC model. We examine the information and 
compare  it  with  the  levels  of  sensitivity  already 
categorised in ISO 17799. We choose ISO 17799 as a 
comparison  because  the  classification  it  proposed  is 
well suited to our hospital environment. From Fig. 1, 
we  could  find  that  the  information  that  is  exchanged 
among  Doctor,  Patient  and  Nurse,  includes  patient’s 
information such as patient’s personal information and 
detailed medical information. The information can be 
considered as extremely sensitive (this information is 
considered to be equivalent to ISO17799’s Top Secret.) 
and  should  not  be  revealed  to  others  except  for  the 
Patients themselves, Doctors and the Nurses in charged.  
  Communications  between  Paramedic  and  SC  can 
be  considered  as  highly  sensitive,  as  in  ISO17799’s 
Highly   Confidential, because it contains information 
such as data collected at the site (e.g., current condition 
of  a  patient,  allergy  types,  heart  rate  and  blood 
pressure),  medical  history  and  patient’s  personal 
information.  Communications  between  NurseÛSW 
and  SWÛPatient  may  result  in  information  that  fall 
into  categories  between  sensitive  and  low  sensitive, 
which  we  labelled  it  as  medium  sensitive  (as  in 
ISO17799’s  Proprietary),  e.g.:  name,  contact  person 
and ward number, appointments requests and a list of 
social workers that help patients either at the hospital or 
at home, which should be treated personal and should 
not be disclosed to public. 
  Information that falls into categories between low 
sensitive and no sensitive is labelled as low sensitive, as 
in ISO17799’s Internal Use Only, like any non-medical 
related  information,  such  as  information  about 
application  systems  or  internal  issues  regarding  the 
hospital. This information is still considered as internal 
information and should not be disclosed to public. The 
one  that  can  be  made  public  is  no  sensitive,  as  in 
ISO17799’s  Public  Documents  such  as  general 
information about the hospital, or general information 
about health, common diseases and possible treatments. J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1691-1703, 2011 
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Classifying the information in the hospital: The reason 
why  we  categorize  the  information  into  its  levels  of 
sensitivity  is  that,  from  the  categorization,  we  will 
construct our own security model, where we proposed 
suitable  security  mechanisms  for  each  level  of 
sensitivity. In the previous section, we have identified the 
levels of sensitivity of the information in the hospital. In 
our approach, we adopt the ISO 17799 standard as our 
basis of information classification. We have identified all 
entities that contribute to the hospital’s information flow, 
either  from  within  the  organization  or  from  the 
organization to the outside network (Fig. 1). We have 
also identified the types of information that need to be 
protected, such as explained in Table 1. 
  Now,  we  refer  to  the  ISO  17799  and  adopt  this 
standard of information classification. We classify the 
information  in  e-health  into  five  categories,  together 
with  the  degree  of  security  protection  that  should  be 
applied to the information. 
 
·  Top secret: Contains extremely sensitive patient’s 
information.  The  distribution  of  this  kind  of 
information  is  very  restricted  and  must  be 
protected  all  the  time.  Highest  security 
protection must be applied. 
·  Highly  confidential:  Contains  highly  sensitive 
information,  related  to  the  patient’s  information 
that should not be shared internally or made public. 
It  includes  information  that  is  obtained  from 
mobile  devices  to  the  organization.  Security 
should be very high and suitable for devices with 
limited resources. 
·  Proprietary:  Contains  medium  sensitive 
information related to the information that is required 
for  the  operational  work  routines  of  the  hospital’s 
staff. Use by authorized personnel only. Security at 
this level is medium high. 
·  Internal  use  only:  Contains  low  sensitive 
information,  which  is  not  approved  for  general 
circulation outside the organization. Security at this 
level is low. 
·  Public: Information that can be disclosed to public. 
Security at this level is minimal. 
 
  In  this  classification,  we  choose  to  use  highest, 
very  high,  medium  high,  low  and  minimal  to 
distinguish the degree of security or the security level 
provided in each categories (which is equivalent to the 
term used in ISO 17799, which are highest, very high, 
high, controlled but normal and minimal). 
 
RESULTS 
 
MLC-Classifying the communications: Our approach 
centred  on  how  to  secure  communication  sessions 
between  two  points,  which  transmit  information  that 
has different levels of sensitivity. We are interested on 
how to classify every communication between users in 
e-health,  based  on  the  levels  of  sensitivity  of  the 
information transmitted during the communication. By 
classifying the communication, we can provide flexible 
security mechanisms around the communication based 
on organizational needs. We propose the communications 
in  e-health  to  be  categorized  into  five  layers,  which  is 
Layer 1 to Layer 5, based on the five classifications of 
information described in previous section. Table 2 shows 
the five types of communications in MLC. The security 
protection suggested in each layer is in accordance with 
the security provided in the ISO 17799. 
 
Layer  1:  For  communication  between  users  that 
exchange Top Secret information, which is extremely 
sensitive.  The  Highest  protection  mechanisms  should 
be applied. The information should be protected against 
threats and loss and disclosed only to authorized users 
such as doctors, patients themselves and the nurses in 
charged. Any disclosure to other users must follow the 
patients’ consent. 
 
Table 2: Five layers of communication in MLC 
Layer  Types of data 
sensitivity  communicated  Users 
Layer 1 Top secret  Contains Extremely  DoctorÛDoctor 
  Sensitive information:  DoctorÛPatient 
  Patient’s personal  DoctorÛNurse 
  information and detailed  NurseÛPatient 
  medical information 
Layer 2 Highly  Contains Highly  ParamedicÛSC 
Confidential  Sensitive information: 
  Patient information that 
  should not be shared 
  internally or made 
  public and information 
  obtained from the 
  paramedic at an 
  accident spot 
Layer 3 Proprietary  Contains Medium  DoctorÛSW 
  sensitive information:  NurseÛSW 
  Patient’s information  PatientÛSW 
  that is required for the 
  operational work 
  routines of the 
  hospital’s staff. 
Layer 4  Contains low sensitive  SyA Û all users 
Internal Use  information 
Only  Any information that is not  
  approved for general circulation 
   outside the organization. 
Layer 5  Open channel: No  The public 
Public  sensitive information 
  such as general information on the 
  hospital, information on health, diseases, 
  frequently asked questions, annual reports 
  and services available Secure open channel: 
  any user, e.g. a researcher who wants to   get 
  access or contact information to any 
  anonymous sensitive information J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1691-1703, 2011 
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Layer  2:  For  communication  between  users  that 
exchange Highly Confidential information, which cannot 
be  shared  internally  or  made  public.  This  includes 
information which is obtained from mobile devices to the 
organization. Security at this layer should be very high 
and suitable for devices with limited resources. 
 
Layer  3:  For  communication  between  users  that 
exchange Proprietary information, which is required for 
the operational work routines of the hospital. Security 
at this level is medium high. 
 
Layer  4:  For  communication  between  users  that 
exchange  Internal  Use  Only  information,  which  is 
related to general information about the organization’s 
system and non-medical related information. Security at 
this level is low.  
 
Layer  5:  For  communication  between  users  that 
exchange Public information. This layer is divided into 
two that are with security, called secure open channel 
and  without  security,  called  public  open  channel. 
Security at this level is minimal. In the next section we 
discuss  how  we  proposed  protection  mechanisms  at 
each  layer  with  different  levels  of  security,  by  using 
cryptography protocols. 
 
MLC-proposed security mechanisms: Our focus is to 
secure the process of message exchanges between two 
points,  which  is  between  a  sender  and  a  recipient  in 
different communicating environments. Both of the users 
would want to make sure that the message sent or received 
is safe from any unauthorized access (confidentiality), not 
modified (integrity) and the originality of the message is 
guaranteed (nonrepudiation). 
  The  sender  would  also  want  to  make  sure  that 
he/she can prove that the message is from him/her (non-
repudiation).  The  recipient  would  want  to  make  sure 
that  he/she  can  access  the  message  whenever  he/she 
needs to (availability). 
  The  MLC  is  taking  into  account  of  providing 
flexible security protections in order to address security 
needs  in  e-health.  The  MLC  provides  three  types  of 
security mechanisms, which are data security, channel 
security,  as  well  as  data  and  channel  security.  Data 
security uses cryptography protocols such as symmetric 
encryption/decryption,  hash  function  and  digital 
signature, while channel security uses the SSL protocol. 
We discuss each of the MLC’s security mechanisms in 
details in the following sections. 
Mechanism1-data security: A sender wants to send a 
plaintext to a recipient. Both of them need cryptography 
protocols  to  secure  (and  recover)  the  plaintext.  The 
following  describes  the  notations  used  in  the 
cryptography processes: 
 
·  Public  and  Private  keys  of  the  recipient  (pubKr, 
privKr) 
·  Public  and  Private  keys  of  the  sender:  (pubKs, 
privKs) 
·  Symmetric keys K; 
·  Plaintext, P, Hash of Plaintext, H(P) 
·  Digital signature, S 
 
  In  our  approach,  we  use  the  symmetric  key 
encryption,  hash  function  and  digital  signature  to 
provide data security. The following describes the step-
by-step process at the sender’s and recipient’s sides: 
 
Cryptography Protocol at the sender side:  
 
·  Symmetric encryption: encrypts the plaintext into 
ciphertext using a key K. The encryption process 
ensures the confidentiality of the plaintext: 
 
Ciphertext = E (P)K 
 
·  Hash  function:  Computes  hash  value  from  the 
plaintext, H(P). The hash value will be used by the 
recipient to check the integrity of the plaintext and 
verify whether the plaintext is tampered or not. The 
recipient  recalculates  the  hash  value  from  the 
plaintext retrieved from the ciphertext and compares 
it to the one sent by the sender. If both are matched, 
then the plaintext is genuine and the integrity of the 
plaintext is verified.  
·  Key exchange: The key K, should be encrypted and 
sent  to  the  recipient,  so  that  K  can  be  used  to 
decrypt the message at the recipient’s side. In order 
for the sender to make sure only the recipient can 
recover  the  key,  K  will  be  encrypted  with  the 
recipient’s  public  key,  pubKr.  To  avoid  a  third 
party to steal and remove  H(P) that is computed 
earlier, it can be encrypted together with K using 
pubKr and we name the result of the encryption as: 
 
Cipherkey= E (K, H(P)) pubKr 
 
·  Digital signature: In order for the sender to prove 
that  the  Cipherkey  is  from  him/her,  the  sender 
signs  it  using  his/her  private  key  (privKs)  to 
produce signature S. S = E(Cipherkey)privKs  J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1691-1703, 2011 
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·  Send  message:  Afterwards,  the  sender  can  send 
Ciphertext,  Cipherkey  and  S  to  the  recipient. 
HTTP protocol is used to transfer message for the 
wired network, so that SSL can be used to secure 
the channel. For the wireless network, we use the 
Global  System  for  Mobile  communications 
(GSM)  network,  or  wireless  LAN  (WiFi)  to 
transfer the message. 
 
Cryptography Protocol at the recipient side: 
 
·  To check that cipherkey is indeed come from the 
sender, S is verified against Cipherkey 
·  If  Cipherkey  is  valid,  then  the  following  is 
executed 
·  use  privKr  to  decrypt  Cipherkey:  D(Cipherkey) 
privKr = K, H(P) 
·  Then, use K to decrypt Ciphertex: D(Ciphertext)K 
= P 
·  Finally, verifies P by calculating a new H(P) from 
P  and  compare  it  with  the  one  in  (a).  If  proved 
valid, keep P. 
 
Mechanism2-Channel security: In the channel security, 
the sender and recipient exchanges certificates and then 
the sender establishes SSL channel to the recipient side 
and  simply  transfer  the  plaintext.  Certificates  can  be 
obtained  through  the  Security  Administrator  in  an 
organization,  which  is  in  charged  with  creating 
identification (Id) and a password for user accounts. 
 
Mechanism3-Both data and channel security: When 
using option of both data and channel security, Sender 
sends all Ciphertext, Cipherkey and Signature S to the 
recipient through the SSL channel. 
 
The Key size for the symmetric key encryption: The 
key  K  is  an  important  component  of  an  encryption 
process because it represents the level of security that 
the  algorithm  can  provide.  According  to  Bidgoli 
(2004), a symmetric cryptography system with n-bit 
of keys has a security level of n, if it can endure a 
generic attack (to find the key,  when plaintext and 
ciphertext are known beforehand), using efforts less 
than the exhaustive search or ‘bruteforce’ attack. The 
selection  of  the  key  size  is  based  on  the  level  of 
security  required  for  a  cryptography  system.  The 
longer the key, the higher the security it can provide 
because the difficulty of trying all possible keys in 
the exhaustive search is directly proportional to the 
number  of  bits  used  (Blaze  et  al.,  1996).  This 
answers why shorter key sizes can only provide low 
security as it will take less time to find the key using 
the exhaustive search, compared to longer key sizes. 
  The  US  government  policy  provides 
recommendations on the symmetric key sizes to protect 
classified  information  namely  Top  Secret,  Secret  and 
Confidential information (CNSS, 2003). The Advanced 
Encryption Standard or AES algorithm is chosen for this 
purpose. AES-192 bit or AES-256 bit is chosen to secure 
the Top Secret information, while AES-128 bit is chosen 
to secure both Secret and Confidential information. 
  Debates  on  selecting  symmetric  key  sizes  for  a 
cryptography system has been and still going on. It is 
important to make sure that the key size chosen for a 
cryptography system is proven to be strong. There are 
many efforts to find flaws in the key size for certain 
algorithms  mainly  using  brute-force.  Brute-fore 
attacks can be achieved by computing in parallel that 
is, one can easily add as many processors as desired 
to perform partial search of the key. 
  Many  suggestions  have  been  made  regarding  the 
selection  of  the  symmetric  key  sizes  selection. 
ECRYPT (2008) argued that different information has 
different lifespan and a key size selected to protect a 
particular information should be larger than the lifespan 
of  the  information.  For  examples,  electronic  banking 
transactions have brief security protection and private 
information like medical information needs protection 
for a lifetime of a patient. 
  In the late 1995, Blaze et al. (1996) made an adhoc 
report  regarding  the  minimum  symmetric  key  sizes 
required for commercial security. The report was made 
to  discuss  a  solution  and  address  the  problem  of 
inadequacy  of  the  confidentiality  protection  provided 
by  the  existing  key  sizes.  They  reported  that  a 
symmetric cipher with 40-bit key does not provide any 
protection against brute force attack and added that the 
56-bit  of  DES  is  considered  inadequate,  although 
Bidgoli (2004) argued that there was not any attack that 
could break DES with security level of 56, except for 
the exhaustive  search of the key. Blaze et al. (1996) 
suggested that 75-bit key was adequate in the late 1995 
based on the available equipments and time needed to 
find 40-bits and 56-bits  keys at that time. They then 
proposed  that  90-bit  key  was  the  minimum  key  size 
required to provide security for the next 20 years (from 
late  1995).  ECRYPT  (2008)  supported  Blaze  et  al. 
(1996)’s  report  and  claimed  that  the  method  is  still 
reasonable  to  be  exercised.  Bidgoli  (2004)  came  out 
with  a  formal  formulation  on  how  to  determine  key 
sizes for symmetric key with the lifespan of the key. 
This formulation was an updated version of his works 
in 2000. J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1691-1703, 2011 
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  Bidgoli’s work was based on the DES 56-bit key, 
which was first introduced in 1977. DES was first being 
reviewed in the year of 1982. He suggested that DES 
has provided adequate protection in the year of 1982. 
Based  on  this,  he  studied  the  next  security  level 
required in proportion with years. He referred to the 
Moore’s Law which was formulated in 1965 (Fibikova 
and Vyskoc, 2001; Lenstra and Verheul, 2000) stating 
that  the  amount  of  computing  power  and  random 
access memory one gets, doubles every 18 months. He 
then suggested that the security level should also be 
increased by one for every 18 months, starting from 
year 1982. For example, a cryptography system should 
use  66-bit  (56-bit+10)  in  10  period  of  18  months 
(which is equivalent to 15 years) and therefore should 
give adequate protection in 1997 (which is obtained 
from 1982+15).    
  Bidgoli  (2004)  introduced  a  formula  to  find  the 
adequate key size, K in year Y: 
 
K = 56+2 (Y-1982)/3   (1) 
 
  For example, in 20 years time from 2009, (which is 
2029) the adequate key size is K = 56 + 2 (2029-1982) / 
3 = 87, in other word, 87-bit keys should be used until 
the year of 2029 to provide adequate protection. We can 
also find Y, if given the key size K by: 
 
Y = 1982+3 (K-56)/2   (2) 
 
  Based on (Blaze et al., 1996) and (Bidgoli, 2004) 
works, ECRYPT (2008) recommended key sizes with 
the lifespan of the key, shown in the Table 3. ECRYPT 
(2008) reported that 80-bit key is  suitable  for a very 
short term protection against a brute-force attack and 
added that if an attacker is able to pre-compute the data, 
the 80-bit key is breakable. The report also stated that 
the  32  and  64-bit  keys  are  not  suitable  for 
confidentiality protection because the 32-bit key does 
not  offer  any  protection,  while  the  64-bit  key  offers 
very poor protection. 
  We  calculate  the  lifespan  for  each  key  length 
using  Bidgoli  (2004)  formulation  in  (2)  shown  in 
Table 4 in the last column. We compare the duration 
of protection given by (Bidgoli, 2004) with (Blaze et 
al.,  1996),  (ECRYPT,  2008)  and  the  US  Policy 
(CNSS,  2003).  Although  there  is  a  huge  gap  of 
lifespan between ECRYPT and Lenstra formulations, 
we can summarize that both recommendations, as well 
as the US policy suggest: 
·  256-bit  key  and  192-bit  key  provide  highest 
security for a very long term protection 
·  128-bit provides medium high security for a long 
term protection 
·  112-bit  provides  medium  security  for  a  medium 
term protection and 
·  key  bits  from  80-bit  provides  low  security  for  a 
short term protection 
 
  From the summary, we recommend the symmetric 
key sizes value for every player in the MLC model is 
provided in ranges like the following: 
 
·  193-bit and longer: Suitable for Layer 1, to secure 
the Top Secret information that needs the highest 
security protection 
·  129-bit to 192-bit: Suitable for Layer 2, to secure 
the  Highly  Confidential  information  that  needs  a 
very high security protection 
·  112-bit to 128-bit: Suitable for Layer 3, to secure 
the  Proprietary  information  that  needs  a  medium 
high security protection 
·  80-bit to 111-bit: Suitable for Layer 4, to secure the 
Internal  Use  Only  information  that  needs  a  low 
security protection 
 
  Table  5  describes  the  recommended  key  sizes  in 
each layer in MLC. The US Policy recommendation is 
also included for comparison purposes. The table shows 
that Layer 1 and Layer 2 key sizes are aligned with the 
US’ Top Secret key sizes (192- bit for Layer 2, 193-bit 
and  longer  for  Layer  1).  Layer  2  supports  mobile 
devices security and therefore, key length as low as 
112-bit is supported for low processing power device. 
For Layer 3, we choose 112 to 128-bit key to provide 
medium security, which also aligned with US’s Secret 
key sizes. For Layer 4, key sized from 80-bits to 111-
bit are chosen to provide low security. By providing 
key  length  values  in  certain  ranges,  we  can  offer  a 
wider range of key sizes for each layer. In summary, 
we  conclude  the  security  mechanism  in  the  MLC 
model,  which  includes  data  and  channel  security  as 
depicted in Table 6. 
  For  channel  security,  cipher  suites  from  any 
available  provider  can  be  used  to  provide  protection. 
Table  7  provide  examples  of  cipher  suites  from 
SunX509.  Because  of  the  limitation  of  the  available 
cipher suite provided from the SSL providers, (which 
only provides Layer 1 with 256-bit and Layer 2 with 
168/128-bit  protection),  we  could  use  128-bit  cipher 
suites as alternatives for Layer 3 and Layer 4 as well. J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1691-1703, 2011 
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Table 3: Security levels excerpt from Table 7.4 from ECRYPT (2008) 
Security (bits)  Protections   Comment 
80   Very short-term  ≤ 4 years 
  protection against  protection 
  agencies, long 
  term protection 
  against small 
  organizations 
96  Legacy standard  ≈ 10 years protection 
  Level 
112   Medium-term protection  ≈ 20 year protection 
128   Long-term protection  ≈ 30 years protections 
256  Foreseeable  Good protection 
  future”  against quantum 
    computers (Shor, 1997) 
 
Table 4: The existing key size recommendations 
Recommended 
key size (in bit)  Blaze  ECRYPT  US Policy  Lifespanl 
75   Adequate      ≈3 years 
  until late 
  1995 
80     ≤ 4years    ≈ 10years 
90   Adequate 
  until 2015 
  ≈ 20 years      ≈ 25 years 
96    ≈ 10years    ≈ 34years 
112     ≈ 20 years    ≈ 58years 
128     ≈ 30 years  Confidential 
      and Secret  ≈ 82 years 
192       Top Secret   ≈ 178years 
256     Foreseeab 
    le future  Top Secret   ≈ 274years 
 
Table 5: Key size recommendation for each layer in MLC 
  Keylengths    Key lengths 
US policy  (in bit)  MLC  (in bit) 
Top Secret   192/256   Layer 1  193 and 
    (Top secret)  longer 
Secret  128  Layer 2  Wired: 
    (Highly  129-192 
    Confidential)  Lightweight 
      devices: 
      112-192 
Confidentia l  128   Layer 3  112-128 
    (Propriety)   
    Layer 4 
    (Internal use only)  80 
 
Table 6: The security specifications in MLC model   
  Security  Key lengths (in 
Layers  mechanisms  bit) for data security 
Layer 1  Data and channel 
(Top Secret)  security 
193 and longer 
Layer 2  Data or channel  Wired: 129-192 
(Highly  security 
Confidential)  *mobile devices  Wireless:112-192 
  use data security only 
Layer 3(Propriety)  Data or channel security  112-128 
Layer 4  Data or channel  80-111 
(Internal Use  security 
Only) 
Layer 5    ID and 
(Public)    Password (for 
  -   secure open channel) 
Table 7: Cipher suites provided by SunX509 provide 
256-bit  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 
  TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA 
168-bit  SSL_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, 
  SSL_DHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA 
128-bit  SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5, 
  SSL_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, 
  TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, 
  TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA 
 
  For Layer 1, data and channel security are used to 
provide  the  highest  protection  mechanism.  The  key 
lengths for data encryption are from 193-bit and above. 
Layer  2  uses  data  or  channel  security  only.  For  data 
security, 129-bit to 192-bit of keys are used with the wired 
network, while 112-bit to 192-bit of keys are chosen for 
the wireless network. Layer 3 and Layer 4 also provide 
two  options  either  data  or  channel  security,  with  key 
lengths of 112 to 128-bit and 80 to 111-bit respectively. 
For Layer 5 that is intended for public use, we could use 
ID and password only, to support secure open channel. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
MLC  Model-Justifications  and  Advantages:  In  e-
ehalth, different users communicate different types of 
information. There is sensitive information that has to 
be kept confidential and there is also information that 
can  be  shared  with  public.  Remote  users  such  as 
patients can now use the Internet to communicate with 
their doctors and nurses from home and be part of e-
health  users.  The  MLC  model  provides  security 
mechanisms  to  secure  different  types  of 
communications  among  different  users  in  ehealth 
according  to  their  needs.  For  example,  a  nurse  can 
communicate  through  a  communication,  which  is 
secure or less secure depending on the situation. The 
nurse  can  communicate  through  the  highest  level  of 
security when communicating with doctors or patients. 
Alternatively, he/she can use a medium level of security 
when communicating with SWs, or a minimum level of 
security when communicating with SA. 
  By using different combinations of  key sizes  for 
data  and  channel  security,  flexibile  security  can  be 
provided to the health organizations. Different security 
strengths can be provided at each layer depending on 
the  sensitivity  of  the  data.  The  extremely  sensitive 
information can be secured using the highest security 
mechanisms,  while  low  sensitive  information  can  be 
secured with minimal security mechanisms. Therefore, 
any excess security applied on the communication can 
be avoided  when it is not  needed. MLC  satisfies the J. Computer Sci., 7 (11): 1691-1703, 2011 
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current technologies gaps and limitations, where users 
are now able  to communicate  with different  types of 
security mechanisms suitable for their needs. 
  A set of encryption algorithms that are proven to be 
reliable by experts can be chosen to secure the layers. 
The selection of the algorithms can be made or decided 
by  the  Security  Administrator  in  the  organization.  In 
MLC, there are data and channel security provided to 
users in such a way that the user can choose the most 
suitable  security  processes  in  terms  of  cost  and 
efficiency.  For  example,  the  organization  can  choose 
SSL channel for the communication, which is cheaper 
than the data encryption, however, with a trade-off of 
inflexible security configuration when the user needs to 
change  to  stronger  or  weaker  security  level. 
Alternatively, the organization can choose to use data 
security  only,  with  suitable  encryption  key  sizes, 
described  in  Table  6.  Meanwhile,  when  especially 
excess  security  is  needed  for  an  extremely  important 
communication, the organization can opt for data and 
channel security. 
  In  addition,  communication  with  low  processing 
power  devices  like  PDAs  and  smart  phones  are 
provided with appropriate data security with key sizes 
available  from  112-bit.  The  organization  can  save 
resources  such  as  CPU  processing  power  for  the 
lightweight  devices  using  appropriate  key  lengths  to 
give better performance to the communication. 
  However, there is always a trade-off between strong 
security and performance. The longer the key lengths, the 
slower the performance of the security processes. Longer 
key length provides better security because more works 
and efforts are required by the attackers to find the key. 
Therefore,    if    security    is    important,    stronger  
algorithms  are  selected  with  decreasing  performance. 
Otherwise shorter key lengths with high performance can 
be chosen according.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
  From  the  study,  we  learned  that  current  security 
technologies cannot cater for different kind of security 
needs because of the rigid way the security mechanisms 
are constructed. The security level or security strength 
in  the  current  technologies  can  only  be  set  to  one 
particular value for all communications sessions. As a 
consequence,  the  need  for  a  stronger  or  a  weaker 
security  level  in  different  communications  cannot  be 
satisfied,  without  having  to  reconfigure  the  whole 
communication  process.  In  other  words,  current 
security  technologies  did  not  support  automatic  and 
flexible security for different communications. 
  We addressed the problem by first, identifying the 
users and the types of communications that occurred in 
e-health.  Then  we  identified  the  different  types  of 
information  in  e-health  and  the  different  levels  of 
sensitivity  of  the  information.  We  classified  the 
information  into  five  categories  based  on  ISO17799 
standards, which was according to the sensitivity levels. 
Secondly, from the classification of the information, we 
then  categorized  the  communications  in  e-health  into 
five categories (which we call layers later on), so that 
we could provide appropriate security mechanisms for 
each layer of the communication. Lastly, we introduced 
our  MLC  model  based  on  five  layers  of 
communications. MLC provides two types of security 
mechanisms, which are data and/or channel security for 
wired  and  wireless  devices,  with  a  range  of  security 
strengths provided through the symmetric encryptions. 
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